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ON DISARMAMENT

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19 July 1966
ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND SEVENTH-FOURTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 19 July 1966, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. C. LUKANOV (Bulgaria)

THE UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN

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PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A. F. AZEREDO da SILVEIRA
Mr. G. de CARVALHO SILOS
Mr. A. da COSTA GUIMARAES
Mrs. C. BIDART

Bulgaria:

Mr. C. LUKANOV
Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV
Mr. D. POPOV
Mr. T. DAMIANOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E. L. M. BURNS
Mr. C. J. MARSHALL
Mr. P. D. LEE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. Z. CERNIK
Mr. V. VAJNAR
Mr. R. KLEIN

Ethiopia:

Mr. A. ABERRA
Mr. A. ZELLEKE
Mr. E. ASSPAW

India:

Mr. V. C. TRIVEDI
Mr. K. P. JAIN

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. G. P. TOZZOLI
Mr. S. AVETTA
Mr. F. SORO

Mexico:

Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO
Mr. M. TELLO MACIAS

Nigeria:

Mr. G. O. IJEWERE
Mr. M. B. BRIMAH

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI
Mr. B. KAJDY

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU
Mr. N. ECOBESCU
Mr. E. GLASER
Mr. C. UNGUREANU

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL
Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD
Mr. J. PRAWITZ

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. A. A. ROSHCHIN
Mr. Y. M. VORONTSOV
Mr. M. P. SHELEPIN
Mr. I. I. CHEPROV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. H. KHALLAF
Mr. A. OSMAN
Mr. A. KASSEM
Mr. A. A. SALAM

United Kingdom:

Miss E. J. M. RICHARDSON
Mr. M. R. MORLAND

United States of America:

Mr. G. BUNN
Mr. C. G. BREAN
Mr. A. NEIDLE
Mr. H. B. MOULTON

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. O. FREY

The CHAIRMAN (Bulgaria) (translation from Russian): I declare open the 274th plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. GOMEZ ROBLEDO (Mexico) (translation from Spanish): "Anxieties wax and hopes wane ...". Often in the past few days those words of Miguel de Cervantes have come to my mind as we see drawing near, on the horizon of time, the end of our labours for this year. Whether we like to admit it or not, all of us -- in our inner consciousness at least -- are lowering the sails of this vessel in which we are navigating, sails that were so upright and gallant when they were filled with the wind of hope. Unless a veritable moral miracle occurs, I do not see how we can in our remaining meetings agree on a draft, acceptable to all, of the treaty to which we have assigned the most urgent priority (the only point on which there has been a consensus): the treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. How can we, here and now, agree on all its details when its basic concepts -- not to mention their practical applications -- are still being so keenly discussed?

In these circumstances my delegation feels that it would be wisest to have no false hopes that, in the normal expectation of human affairs, this may happen between now and September; but we should certainly do everything we can to bring it about between September and December in the General Assembly of the United Nations. Indeed, it is likewise normal that one hundred and seventeen may see further than seventeen; we, the seventeen, can help the one hundred and seventeen now if we at least provide them with a faithful and co-ordinated picture of our agreements and differences.

It is said that to present a problem properly is to go halfway towards its solution: we can and must do the former at least, even if we cannot do the latter, before the General Assembly. That we must do so is quite clear; and that we can should also be clear in the light of the discussions we have had on this subject in the past few weeks. During these discussions both sides -- and this is indeed the only real progress we have made in our negotiations -- have gone to the heart of the matter, in medias res, each side putting forward, with a dialectical strictness which we sincerely admire, very important objections to the other's draft treaty.

(Mr. Gomez Robledo, Mexico)

My delegation believes that the two major nuclear Powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, have equally rendered a conspicuous service in submitting their respective drafts, and that, out of elementary courtesy to our co-Chairmen and since there is no other draft before us, we should proceed to the direct examination of those drafts and, without any further delay after the very lengthy general debate, make a comparative study of both. Since this study was initiated at our meeting of 5 July by the Canadian and United Kingdom delegations (ENDC/PV.270), we consider that we too should make our contribution; although we realize that it may have no immediate result, we are persuaded that anything we say that is at all reasonable will in due course bear fruit.

Lord Chalfont said on one occasion (ENDC/PV.265, p.4) -- I am translating his thoughts freely -- that in a matter of such gravity which so greatly affects the destiny of mankind, however serious the circumstances may be, so long as the final catastrophe has not come about we can never say that we have reached the "point of no return", a desperate and irreversible position. Only a conflagration would make negotiations impossible. With this attitude of mind, with this unquenchable hope, we shall venture to examine both the Soviet draft (ENDC/164) and the United States draft (ENDC/152 and Add.1), in their areas both of agreement and of disagreement; because we think that this is the best method and the one which the General Assembly of the United Nations will in all probability have to apply at its next session.

Beginning with the preamble, we should have no objection to accepting the wording of either of the drafts, or an agreed common text; since both place the non-proliferation treaty within the context of general and complete disarmament, thus corresponding to the fundamental idea of the non-aligned countries that the treaty should not be a final and absolute aim but rather subordinated to the ultimate aim, which is disarmament.

In our opinion the only appreciable difference between the preambles of the two drafts is that which results -- and this is only natural -- from the different time scales in the disarmament plans of the two major nuclear Powers. Hence, while

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the United States draft expresses the desire "to achieve effective agreements to halt the nuclear arms race, and to reduce armaments" (ENDC/152), the Soviet draft in its turn refers to "the earliest possible attainment of agreement on the complete prohibition and elimination of all types of nuclear weapons" (ENDC/164).

In passing, I will say that in the English text the phrase "the earliest possible attainment" perhaps does not express (although naturally I may be misunderstanding a language which is not my own) the sense of "inmediatez" in the Spanish text. As, unfortunately, we do not understand the Russian original we cannot say which is the more faithful translation, and we defer to the judgment of experts in elucidating that point. In any case, and in conclusion, we do not believe that the authors of the two drafts would be unable to agree on a text which would not stress so much the greater or lesser latitude of time in their disarmament plans but, on the contrary, would bring out very clearly their common determination, as proclaimed so often by both sides, to initiate and complete as soon as possible the various stages leading to general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

With article I, which in both drafts lays down the obligations of the nuclear Powers, we come to what, in accordance with the terminology proposed by the Maltese representative at the twentieth session of the General Assembly, could be termed not exactly proliferation in the strict sense of the word but rather dissemination. At the meeting of the First Committee held on 25 October 1965 the Maltese representative said:

"It might be agreed that the term 'nuclear proliferation' be used exclusively to denote the acquisition through independent development or otherwise of nuclear weapons by a hitherto non-nuclear Power or entity; while 'nuclear dissemination' could be defined as the creation by a nuclear Power of a new nuclear entity or Power either by the direct or indirect transfer of weapons or technology or by granting ownership, control or independent use of nuclear weapons to a hitherto non-nuclear Power or entity" (A/C.1/PV.1362, pp.37, 38-40).

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As we said here on another occasion (ENDC/PV.242, pp. 9, 10), we have no objection to this terminology, provided that the treaty which is adopted takes into account both aspects of the spread of nuclear weapons. Fortunately this is done in the two drafts we are considering. In both of them article I refers to so-called "dissemination" and article II to "proliferation". We could also speak of proliferation through fecundation and proliferation through spontaneous generation; since we are using metaphors here, everything is possible, even if it is not possible in biology. Thus we can consider that what is really decisive in the final treaty we agree upon will not be general concepts, but specific acts which are prohibited or permitted, likewise very specifically; since definitions will not help us very much unless they define acts and not concepts. With that criterion then, we will start without further delay on article I in both drafts.

In the United States text the concept of "control" is basic. That term has also to be used in Spanish, although it is not to be found in the Dictionary of the Academy, because "dominio" (which is how "control" has been translated in the official documents) means, neither more nor less, "propriedad" (ownership). In the United States draft, therefore, there is no dissemination as long as a State not possessing nuclear weapons does not acquire control of such weapons; and control, in its turn, is defined quite clearly in article IV(c) as "right or ability to fire nuclear weapons without the concurrent decision of an existing nuclear-weapon State" (ENDC/152/Add.1).

The United States representative, Mr. Foster, in commenting on these texts: article I in relation to article IV -- and no one has been able to do so with greater authority --, has repeatedly stated that "so long as the effective decision to use nuclear weapons is left in the hands of an existing nuclear weapon State, there is no proliferation" (ENDC/PV.263, p.14). Mr. Foster also explained to us at length (ENDC/PV.268, pp. 14, 15) how this control, in his view, provides the greatest security conceivable by man, thanks to a series of secret codes and electronic devices or locks, in such a way that although the nuclear weapons of the United States might be in other territories, and regardless of who had the custody or handling of these weapons, they could never be fired except by the will and

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express order of the President of the United States. That is how we understood the explanations which Mr. Foster was kind enough to give us; and we should be grateful if the United States delegation could correct us if we have misinterpreted him in any way.

The Soviet Union, for its part, has openly expressed its opposition to that concept of proliferation, and therefore in article I of its draft it extends the concept of "control" beyond the actual firing of nuclear weapons to their emplacement and use; furthermore, it introduces along with the concept of "control" the additional concept of "participation". The Soviet draft proposes that States possessing nuclear weapons shall undertake not to transfer, directly or indirectly, to States or groups of States not possessing nuclear weapons "the right to participate in the ownership, control or use of nuclear weapons" (ENDC/164). To sum up, proliferation in this draft would be coextensive with both control and participation, while control itself would cover other acts besides firing. Here, too, we are willing to accept any corrections which Mr. Roshchin may make to our interpretation of the Soviet draft.

The opposition between the two criteria is the real crux proliferationis. This is so because behind the conceptual dialectics are the power politics and the security as they understand it, of the two major nuclear Powers and their allies. For this reason, the problem has to be solved directly between them, and it would therefore be useless for those of us who do not belong to any military alliance to pretend to settle the question by analysing concepts which are only an ideological covering for situations and interests which, whether we like it or not, must be taken into account in international co-existence. The only thing we can do is to exhort these Powers to make, for the sake of peace and tranquillity in the world, the mutual concessions which they deem to be compatible with their prestige and security. We cannot substitute ourselves for them in the essentially subjective assessment of those situations and interests.

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To be more specific, we do not see how we can doubt the solemn guarantee given by the United States that the nuclear weapons belonging to it will never be fired without its express consent and authorization. But neither can we call illusory -- still less mendacious -- the misgiving shown by the Soviet Union when its representatives tell us that they do not feel that their allies' national security is sufficiently protected even with all the secret keys and all the electronic locks of the weapons to which in one way or another the ally or allies of the other major nuclear Powers would have access.

In expressing this feeling of insecurity they do not call the other side's guarantee mendacious. But they do remind us how on more than one occasion, as diplomatic history unfortunately shows, particularly in the First World War, the major ally has lost control of the situation at a certain moment and been dragged by the minor ally into irreparable decisions. And it is quite understandable that this history is still well remembered in the country which in the Second World War contributed in absolute figures the largest share of blood: twenty million dead.

All this is very serious and worthy of respect, and it is not with a priori deductions from the concept of proliferation that we can induce one of the sides to accept thus, without more ado, the assurances offered by the other. We cannot do this even in pure dialectics, because all that dialectics can do is to show the extreme cases, in which it is possible to speak with absolute certainty of non-proliferation or of proliferation; they cannot decide on the doubtful and questionable cases in the broad intermediate zone, which can be settled only by the free agreement of the sides. Dialectics cannot be substituted for this agreement, because once again we are having recourse here to a metaphor, a metaphor drawn from biology; any metaphor, since it is a human construction, goes just as far or just as near as men and States decide.

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In biology, of course, the phenomenon stands by itself, and one can say -- and here textbooks and dictionaries more or less agree -- that proliferation is the multiplication of cells. In our case, on the other hand, the only proliferation which no one questions is that which occurs when a new autonomous centre of decision comes into being: when a State possessing nuclear weapons that have been transferred to it from outside or manufactured by itself can, with legal and material power, do whatever can be done with them. No one then questions that the cell has reproduced itself, this lethal cell of nuclear weapons, just as no one questions that a volcano has appeared when it begins to erupt; but apart from this extreme case, all the rest is subject to discussion and the extensive criterion is just as plausible as the restrictive.

That is what we were able to verify last year in the United Nations when Mr. Lekic, the representative of Yugoslavia, included among forms of proliferation the stationing of such weapons on foreign territories, and on floating bases. (A/C.1/PV.1361, p.57). Well, the stationing by a nuclear Power of its own weapons on foreign territory does not appear to be forbidden in either the United States or the Soviet draft so long as that Power keeps these weapons under its "control"; and the whole of the discussion turns on this term, but not on the fact itself of the stationing. For the Yugoslav representative, on the contrary, "proliferation" was apparently synonymous with "nuclearization", even without the slightest suspicion that in the nuclearized territory a new autonomous centre of decision might come into being.

Not only in policy but also in doctrine the extensive concept of proliferation seems to be gaining ground, by which proliferation would include as we have just seen, the simple deployment of nuclear power by a major nuclear Power. Perhaps influenced by the recent unfortunate accident in the sea off Almeria, Professor Mariano Aguilar Navarro, of the University of Madrid, seems to agree with the criterion of Mr. Lekic by distinguishing between subjective and objective proliferation in the following way:

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"To me what is essential is not the legal title, the legal manner of envisaging the operation. What is decisive is the materiality of the fact that the nuclear area is extended. This takes place subjectively when the number of States manufacturing nuclear weapons increases, or when nuclear Powers transfer such weapons to non-nuclear Powers by sale or gift; but it takes place objectively when the territorial area in which nuclear weapons are located is extended. The essentially strategic nature of the problem obliges me to subordinate the exclusively legal formulae to the typically military situations". ("La No Proliferación y las Medidas Colaterales", Revista Espanola de Derecho Internacional, January-March 1966, vol. XIX, No.1, pp. 16-17).

How good it would indeed be if non-proliferation were synonymous with denuclearization, as we understand it in Latin America. Then there would be neither more nor less, neither subjective nor objective, neither this nor that type of control; the mere presence of nuclear weapons would be inadmissible, whether they are there to be fired, handled, touched or merely looked at. The fact is, however, that in the present world situation the two things are quite different and the parties concerned, and no one else, must agree on the practical meaning of a concept which, like the concept of nuclear proliferation, is not to be found in the nature of things and is not usually defined, like denuclearization, as a mere vacuum or the total absence of nuclear weapons.

Similar reflections could be made on article I, paragraph 3, of the United States draft treaty. Under that paragraph the parties to the treaty undertake "not to take any other action which would cause an increase in the total number of States and associations of States having control of nuclear weapons" (ENDC/152/Add.1). That provision obviously permits the transfer of nuclear weapons into full ownership and control from a nuclear Power to an association of a federal type of which that nuclear Power would become part and in which, by hypothesis, only the federal authority could dispose of the weapons. Thus the group of political entities possessing nuclear weapons would not increase numerically although it would spread out in space.

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Would that be a good or a bad thing? It would all depend, as we see it, on whether proliferation is understood subjectively or objectively in the aforementioned terms. If the subjective criterion is adopted there will be no proliferation, since the decision-making authorities continue to be numerically the same as before. If, on the contrary, the objective criterion is adopted, there will be proliferation, since the area sown with nuclear weapons, as Professor Navarro would say, is extended in space. But, since both criteria are legitimate in the present state of conventional law, the choice has to be made freely and not by the imposition of conceptual logic.

In both draft treaties we welcome the provisions of article I, which substantially agree on the undertaking to be given by the nuclear Powers to refrain absolutely from helping States not possessing nuclear weapons to manufacture them, whether by direct assistance or merely by encouragement or inducement. Nevertheless, it seems to us that the Soviet draft goes too far in prohibiting even the transmission of "any kind of manufacturing, research or other information or documentation which can be employed for purposes of the manufacture or use of nuclear weapons"

(ENDC/164).

Mexico certainly does not want any information or documentation which could be used for purposes of the manufacture or use of nuclear weapons; but we do want the greatest possible amount of scientific information which we consider absolutely necessary in the process of liberation of atomic energy in a perfectly controlled form for peaceful purposes. Since both research and the subsequent processes (in nuclear reactors, for example) are up to a certain point ambivalent and only afterwards take the direction of peace or war, it would follow under the Soviet draft treaty, that we could not receive any scientific information at all for fear lest someone might later use it for warlike purposes.

Of course, we are not unaware of the danger of "diversion", as it is usually called in the lexicon of the nuclear era; but precisely to prevent that risk there are the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and therefore my delegation agrees with article III of the United States draft on the application of those safeguards. Moreover, we are certain that it was not the intention of the Soviet Government to obstruct scientific exchange or the controlled liberation of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. We hope, therefore, that the Soviet delegation

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will see fit to make the necessary clarifications or corrections in a text which at first reading gives rise to the concern which we have just stated with complete frankness.

On article II in both drafts we have no observations to make, since the obligations laid down in them are correlative to those assumed under article I by the nuclear Powers; therefore the drafting differences in article II merely reflect the differences in the preceding article, and the comments I have made on this hold good for article II as well.

Article III of the United States draft has no equivalent in the Soviet draft, and we have already expressed our approval of its substance. Likewise, in dealing with article I we said what we thought was pertinent concerning article IV of the United States draft, which is in fact complementary to article I, since in article IV there are definitions of the basic concepts of the mechanism of the treaty.

Article IV of the Soviet draft, which in its turn has no equivalent in the United States draft, lays down the procedure for amending the treaty. In principle it seems to us to be a good thing that in any treaty in general, and the more so in such an important treaty as this, there should be a clause providing for the way in which the treaty can be amended or revised in the light of experience after its entry into force. It also seems to us to be a very good thing that in the Soviet draft there is a stipulation to the effect that an ad hoc conference shall be convened to approve any amendments, because that is a matter which calls for the greatest reflection and the utmost caution.

But, if that is so, we wonder whether it would not be better to increase the percentages mentioned in the Soviet draft, namely one-third of the parties to the treaty for convening the conference, and a simple majority for approving the amendments, including -- and we have no objection to this -- the votes of all the parties possessing nuclear weapons. Would it not, perhaps, be better to adopt the simple majority rule for convening the conference and a two-thirds majority for approving the amendments, in accordance with the analogous provision in Article 108 of the United Nations Charter? We make that suggestion with the desire to balance to the greatest possible extent the stability of the treaty and the free play of international agreements.

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Where article V is concerned, we have no further comments to make except on paragraph 3. Whenever the treaty lays down obligations for both nuclear and non-nuclear Powers it seems to us prima facie that it would be better to stipulate, as the United States draft does, that the treaty should come into force not only on ratification by all the nuclear Powers but on ratification also by a certain number of the non-nuclear Powers. As for the rest of the paragraph, we have the impression that both drafts say practically the same thing, taking into account the present circumstances. But if those circumstances should change, and if the two nuclear Powers not explicitly mentioned in the United States draft were to become parties to the treaty, we wonder whether they would not regard the omission of their names as discriminatory or derogatory. It seems to us that the Soviet text, without making any explicit mention, achieves the same objective, and that the only thing required would be to add to it the stipulation of the concurrence of a certain number of non-nuclear countries, whose names should not be mentioned either, since that would be tantamount to creating in their favour a privilege or right of veto which would not be justified in the immense community of non-nuclear countries.

In regard to article VI we prefer the United States draft, which lays down that when one of the parties decides to withdraw from the treaty it must state specifically the "extraordinary events" which obliged it to take that serious step, instead of referring to them in a general way and keeping the reasons for its decision "within its royal bosom", as absolute monarchs used to say. On the other hand, we have doubts about the advisability of stipulating that this decision should be communicated to the United Nations Security Council, since that requirement might perhaps dissuade States which are not Members of the United Nations from adhering to the treaty; and as long as they are not Members of the United Nations there would be no reason why they should assume obligations with respect to any of its organs.

Lastly, taking the two drafts together, I do not think that any of the delegations responsible for them will take it as a reproach if I say that they are still incomplete, since they do not include the clauses which are absolutely necessary for implementing the guiding principles contained in resolution 2028 (XX) of the General Assembly of the United Nations (ENDC/161). There is no reproach, for the simple and good reason that the drafts precede the resolution; but they should be

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brought up to date -- that is to say, brought into harmony with the resolution -- as soon as possible. As soon as possible and not later, because we shall have quite enough to do -- as we have seen in certain skirmishes that have already taken place -- to determine the precise contents of the principles, all of which except the fifth are more formal than material, as I said on another occasion, using those terms "formal" and "material" in the sense which they have in Western thought based on the Critique of Pure Reason.

For that very reason we think it would be premature to enter into a discussion on those points until we have concrete proposals in the form of additional articles for the treaty. So far we have only one proposal of that kind, relating to the principle of a balance of responsibilities and obligations between nuclear Powers and non-nuclear Powers. I refer to the proposal, which we all know, of Premier Kosygin, which the Soviet representative submitted on 23 June as an additional article to the Soviet draft treaty and which reads as follows:

"The parties to the treaty possessing nuclear weapons undertake not to use nuclear weapons and not to threaten the use of such weapons against States which do not possess nuclear weapons and in whose territory, territorial waters and air space there are no foreign nuclear weapons" (ENDC/PV.267, p.12).

Since Mexico has never had and never will have nuclear weapons, either national or foreign, on its territory, no matter under what title, we quite willingly accept the Soviet proposal, but on the understanding that the extent of territorial waters will be that determined by each State in the exercise of its sovereign rights; since for the time being there is no rule of international law on that particular point, as was made clear at the Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.

As we said at the meeting of 14 June (ENDC/PV.264, p.7), the only principle among those listed in resolution 2028 (XX) which does not require further clarification, because it merely concerns an obligation not to do certain things or not to interfere, is subparagraph 2(e) concerning the absolute freedom of any group of States to establish among themselves totally denuclearized zones, altogether independently of what may eventually be agreed in the universal treaty on non-proliferation. In our opinion, therefore, it would suffice in a treaty on non-proliferation to reproduce literally the wording of operative subparagraph 2(e) of that resolution in a special article, which could read:

(Mr. Gomez Robledo, Mexico)

"No provision of this treaty shall be interpreted as in any way lessening or restricting the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories".

My delegation considers that the insertion of an article worded in that or a similar way in any non-proliferation treaty is absolutely necessary. Moreover, we do not believe that either of the two major nuclear Powers would have any objection to the addition of a similar article in their respective drafts, since both of them have unequivocally expressed their sympathy for the idea of denuclearized zones. Speaking on behalf of the Soviet Union at the evening meeting of the First Committee of the General Assembly on 30 November 1965, Mr. Tsarapkin said:

"The peoples of the world understand very well that the creation of denuclearized zones leads to the limitation of areas where nuclear weapons could be used and, therefore, to diminishing possibilities of the unleashing of nuclear war, with its catastrophic consequences. The adoption of such measures as the creation of denuclearized zones would give rise to serious obstacles in the way of the dissemination of nuclear weapons to new countries and continents, would contribute greatly to the relaxing of international tensions and slow down the armaments race.

"... The Soviet Union ... considers that in the interests of peace and to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the obligation to create denuclearized zones should be assumed not only by groups of States -- for example, all the States on one continent constituting a vast area -- but also by individual States and countries.

"We should like to mention once more that the Government of the Soviet Union is prepared to guarantee respect on its part for all such zones which might be established if other nuclear Powers would be willing to assume the same obligations" (A/C.1/PV.1390, pp.26,27).

(Mr. Gomez Robledo, Mexico)

The United States Secretary of State, Mr. Rusk, speaking on 22 November 1965 at the Second Extraordinary Inter-American Conference in Rio de Janeiro, said:

"The United States has followed with very keen interest and attention the efforts of the Latin-American countries to reach agreements excluding the proliferation, installation or storing of nuclear weapons on their territories. We have observed the encouraging progress which has been achieved in reaching that objective at meetings held during this year in Mexico City. The United States considers that the plan for denuclearization of Latin America is constructive work by statesmen and is in line with the greatest traditions of the Western Hemisphere. We welcome this effort most warmly, and should be very happy to see its successful outcome."

Those are the preliminary observations which my delegation, in fulfilment of its duty, has deemed necessary to make on the two draft treaties that have been submitted to us. It was in order to free my conscience, and for no other reason, that I have engaged your kind attention at greater length than usual. I have done so also in the belief that no contribution will ever be superfluous which all and each of us can make to the rapid conclusion of a treaty on which depends nothing less than the survival and welfare of mankind.

Mr. BUNN (United States of America): We have listened with great care to the remarks of the representative of Mexico. We welcome his serious effort to achieve a compromise on the actual text of a non-proliferation treaty. We note particularly his suggestion for reciprocal concessions. We shall study his remarks with care. I merely wish to add that we commend Mexico's energetic support for a Latin-American nuclear-free zone. We have been pleased with the progress so far this year. We consider that the denuclearization of Latin America is a very worthy goal and we hope to see its successful achievement. Our discussion of non-proliferation has value if it helps to identify and increase our understanding of important issues. We believe our discussions have entered a stage where issues are being brought into focus and understanding increased.

(Mr. Bunn, United States)

My delegation has studied carefully the questions and statements of the representative of the Soviet Union at our 269th meeting, since some of them relate to fundamental issues involved in the negotiation of a non-proliferation treaty. We do not find that the Soviet representative has, in his recent statements, raised new considerations to assist us in understanding fundamental issues. However, because some of his questions do relate to fundamental points, my delegation wishes to give detailed and serious answers. These answers are, of course, not completely new, for we have answered similar questions in detail before.

We hope that the Soviet representative will give serious attention to the basic questions which we have asked about the practical operation of the Soviet draft treaty (ENDC/164). At the 253rd, 263rd and 268th meetings my delegation pointed out particular difficulties we have with the Soviet draft. At the 270th meeting Mr. Burns and Lord Chalfont summarized problems they have had with it. Mr. Cavalletti has done so many times. These interventions make clear that the key articles of the Soviet draft treaty are not acceptable to the West. We have submitted amendments to our draft treaty (ENDC/152/Add.1) which adopt considerable language from the Soviet text.

However, this attempt to find compromise language has been rejected by the Soviet Union. This means we must seek elsewhere for compromise language. But, as Mr. Foster said at the opening of this summer session, we cannot bridge the differences between us by building only from one side (ENDC/PV.264, p.11). Our hope is that a thorough and careful exchange of ideas will help both sides in their attempts to find a compromise. If Mr. Roshchin will consider seriously both our answers to his questions and the questions which we have put to him, it is our hope that progress will ensue.

I now turn to his questions. First, Mr. Roshchin asked (ENDC/PV.269, p.30) which articles and provisions of the Soviet draft treaty we thought raised new difficulties -- that is, in addition to the one obstacle which the Soviet Union said existed when the Committee adjourned last summer (ENDC/PV.234, p.34). In his statement describing the new obstacles (ENDC/PV.268; p.11) Mr. Foster specified the article numbers of the Soviet text. Much of the language he used to describe the Soviet provisions was taken directly from the English version of the Soviet draft treaty. To give an example of this, I should like to call Mr. Roshchin's attention to the verbatim record of the meeting of 28 June, at which Mr. Foster said:

(Mr. Bunn, United States)

"Article I of the Soviet draft can also be interpreted as prohibiting the transfer to non-nuclear allies of any information concerning use of nuclear weapons. This would prevent any meaningful allied consultations about what to do in the event of a nuclear attack. How can any alliance prepare to defend itself against nuclear attack unless its members can consult about the effects resulting from the use of nuclear weapons by an adversary?" (ibid.).

Reference to the English translation of the Soviet draft treaty shows some of the specific language which concerns us in this connexion. The Soviet draft would, for example, prohibit States possessing nuclear weapons from transmitting to States not possessing them "any kind of ... information ... which can be employed for purposes of the ... use of nuclear weapons" (ENDC/164, p.4). Is that language intended to prohibit allies from consulting with each other about how to defend themselves against nuclear attack? Our European allies cannot ignore the 700 or more Soviet rockets armed with nuclear warheads which are aimed at Western Europe; nor can they ignore the tactical nuclear delivery systems which have been displayed in parades in Eastern Europe.

Does the Soviet Union intend to prevent us from telling our allies what effects such weapons would have on their territory and what manner of response is available if they are attacked? Are the soldiers of our allies to be prohibited from learning those facts about the use of nuclear weapons which would be essential for them to be able to protect themselves -- facts relating to the depths of shelters, periods of contamination, effects of weather conditions and a host of other matters relating to the use of nuclear weapons, matters which are essential for soldiers who might be attacked with such weapons?

In the light of the language of the Soviet draft, we must also be concerned about whether the Soviet Union intends to bar consultations relating to the strategy or tactics of nuclear weapons. In an alliance of independent democratic States, it is necessary to consult regarding the conditions, albeit wholly defensive, under which nuclear weapons might have to be used.

(Mr. Bunn, United States)

These are examples of the difficulties we have; others are similar. To aim missiles at Western Europe and then attempt to prohibit Western Europeans from participating in preparations for their own defence against them would of course be unconscionable. That, as the Russian proverb says, "would make every hen laugh." If the Soviet Union does intend to prohibit such consultations for that purpose, it will by its own actions have destroyed any chance of negotiating a non-proliferation treaty. We cannot but hope that that is not its intention.

Second, Mr. Roshchin asked what kind of allied consultations my delegation had in mind and whether they would have to do with the manufacture of nuclear weapons (ENDC/PV.269, p.32). My answer to the preceding question shows the kind of consultations we have in mind. They have to do with the use of nuclear weapons against NATO and with the use of nuclear weapons to defend the members of NATO. They are therefore the kind of consultations which allies must and will have if their alliance is to be meaningful. They are consultations which cannot be effectively prohibited by any non-proliferation treaty; and they have nothing whatever to do with the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

We are not talking about consultations giving non-nuclear-weapon States information on how to manufacture nuclear weapons. That, clearly, is prohibited by the United States draft treaty. Article I, paragraph 2, states that each of the nuclear-weapon States undertakes not to provide any non-nuclear-weapon State with "assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons." The United States has no intention of contributing in any way to proliferation by consultations within NATO. We assume that the Soviet Union also has no intention of contributing to nuclear proliferation by its consultations with members of the Warsaw Pact alliance. However, the Soviet representative has not told us about the nuclear consultations which must go on within that alliance.

Third, Mr. Roshchin asked whether my delegation intended to tell the Committee what was happening in NATO with respect to plans for nuclear defence, including the so-called McNamara committee, and any discussions on nuclear defence with non-nuclear NATO allies represented here. Much of that information must and will be kept secret for security reasons, as I assume Mr. Roshchin knows. This, obviously, is inherent in the nature of any military alliance. Nevertheless the West has made available a great deal of information on the subject, including many official reports and communiqués. In addition, my delegation has told the

(Mr. Bunn, United States)

Committee about particular aspects of NATO plans for nuclear defence at, for example, the 180th, 215th, 232nd, 241st, 250th, 263rd and 268th meetings. Only recently we quoted Secretary McNamara's testimony that there are no plans in NATO for transfer of control of United States nuclear weapons to any State or group of States (ENDC/PV.268, p.15).

We assume that the Soviet Union's views are similar; but we have not yet received any such assurance from Mr. Roshchin. In fact, all that has been revealed by Warsaw Pact countries about their participation in the use of nuclear weapons is that some of their armed forces have received nuclear-capable missiles and other potential nuclear delivery vehicles and that they demonstrate these vehicles in parades and training exercises.

Fourth, Mr. Roshchin also asked that would happen if a non-nuclear ally of the United States refused to submit to a veto by the United States. My reply is that we do not rely upon the veto alone to keep our nuclear weapons from being fired by unauthorized persons. The United States retains affirmative control over its weapons at all times. Mr. Foster stated at the meeting of 28 June that no United States nuclear weapons can be employed except on orders of the President of the United States (ibid., p.14).

Fifth, Mr. Roshchin asked about the relationship of the United States draft to a possible multilateral, Atlantic or other joint nuclear force within NATO. Mr. Foster and Mr. Fisher have answered those questions at our meetings of 31 August 1965 (ENDC/PV.228, p.40) and 31 March this year (ENDC/PV.253, pp.10 et seq.). In conclusion, we hope that these answers will be useful to Mr. Roshchin and to the other members of the Committee. We hope they will be particularly useful to Mr. Roshchin in reviewing the Soviet text. We are convinced that a sincere effort by each side to understand the other's point of view will facilitate the achievement of a compromise. We want to move in that direction in the time still remaining in this session.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 274th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador Carlo Lukanov, representative of Bulgaria.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Mexico and the United States.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 21 July 1966, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 11.55 a.m.

